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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1945-1946"
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

E

holdings in this state had indicated that while a director
occupies a fiduciary relation to his corporation when purchasing the shares thereof 1 he occupies no such relation in respect to
an individual shareholder and might deal with him at arm's
length, provided no positive fraud is perpetrated. 2 An interesting
exception to that rule has been created by the decision in the
8 where it was held that a director
case of Agatucci v. Corradi
who
possessed knowledge of an imminent sale of the corporate assets
at an enhanced price was under an obligation to reveal such fact
to the shareholder at the time of negotiating for the purchase of
his shares. The failure so to disclose was treated as a species of
fraud and deceit entitling the shareholder to recover his proportionate share of the profit so made. The court there adopted a
ARLIER

* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year,
but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases and
developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 390 Ill. 436 to 393 Ill. 628; from 326 Ill. App. 15 to
329 Ill. App. 243. No new legislation was enacted in this period.
IWood v. MacLean Drug Co., 266 Ill. App. 5 (1932), cert. den. 266 Ill. App. xli.
2 Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464, 98 N. E. 941 (1912) ; Hooker v. Midland Steel
Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445, 106 Am. St. Rep. 170 (1905).
3 327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N. E. (2d) 630 (1945), noted in 24 CHIcAoO-KEXT LAW
RmvEw 272.
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concept, lying between the majority and minority views on the
subject and originating in the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Strong v. Repide, to the effect that
the director is to be regarded as a fiduciary when he possesses
knowledge of "special circumstances" not otherwise available to
the shareholder. In all other cases, arm's length dealing between
the two is still possible.
The statutory right of the shareholder to inspect the books
and records of his corporation 5 has been hedged by limitations
until it now takes an exceptionally strong set of circumstances to
procure compulsory inspection.6 While the statute does not require
any written demand as a condition precedent to suit for that
purpose, it has now been held, in People ex rel. Miles v. Bowev
Industries, Inc.,7 that whatever demand is made should show that
the inspection is desired for a proper purpose. In the absence of
such accompanying explanation, the shareholder would be denied
the right to prove that the inspection was sought for legitimate
ends. It was also held, in Doggett v. North American Life Insurance Company of Chicago,8 that the provisions of the Business
Corporation Act respecting the right of inspection applied to stockholders of insurance companies even though the latter are incorporated under, and regulated by, a separate statute.
Attention was called last year to the decision of the Appellate
Court for the First District in the case of Electrical Contractors'
Association v. A. S. Schulman Electric Company9 concerning the
validity of a corporate by-law fixing membership dues on a percentage basis of the amount of business done by a particular
member. It was then noted that leave to appeal had been granted.
The Illinois Supreme Court has now affirmed the decision of the
4 213 U. S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521, 53 L. Ed. 853 (1909).

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
6 See note to Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 Il. 228, 52 N. E. (2d) 769 (1944),
reversing 317 Ill. App. 436, 46 N. E. (2d) 174 (1943), appearing in 22 CHICAGOKENT LAW REviEw 201-6.
7 327 Il. App. 362, 64 N. E. (2d) 213 (1945).
Leave to appeal has been allowed.
a 328 Ill. App. 613, 66 N. E. (2d) 747 (1946).
9 324 I1. App. 28, 57 N. E. (2d) 220 (1944), noted in 24 CHxCoG-KEIIT LAW
5
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Appellate Court and has declared such a by-law to be valid in the
absence of clear evidence that the operation of the by-law tended
to restrain trade and stifle competition or increased the cost of
the member's services to the general public. 10 The wide-spread
use of by-laws of the character in question makes the decision
especially significant, particularly since similar by-laws had been
repudiated elsewhere at least as applied to persons engaged in
public construction.1 1
Dissatisfaction on the part of certain litigants and their attorneys with the rule that a charitable corporation may not be held
liable for the torts of its servants and agents is evidenced by the
wide variety of attempts that have been made to unseat the
doctrine, or avoid its consequences, ever since it was promulgated
12
for this state by the decision in Parks v. Northwes'tern University.
Another attempt, made during the past year, predicated on the
ground that the fact that the charitable corporation carried public
liability insurance to protect itself from such losses should operate
as a waiver of the immunity, was rejected in Piper v. Epstein. 3
The rigid adherence by the Illinois courts to a doctrine which is
losing ground elsewhere in this country 1 4 invites legislative attention to the problem.
The implications behind the decision in Walden Home
Builders, Inc. v. Schmit 1 5 may be of far-reaching effect. Although
the court there merely held that the 1941 amendment to the Business Corporation Act"6 permitted an action by a dissolved corporation, after its dissolution, upon a cause of action which had accrued
10 391 Ii1. 333, 63 N. E.' (2d) 392, 161 A. L. R.. 787 (1945), noted in 24
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11 Kentucky Ass'n of Highway Contractors v. Williams, 213 Ky. 167, 280 S. W.
937, 45 A. L. R. 544 (1926) ; Associated Wisconsin Contractors v. Lathers, 235 Wis.
14, 291 N. W. 770 (1940).
12 218 Il1. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 556, 4 Ann. Cas. 103 (1905).
13326 Ii. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945), noted in 24 CHIC.AGO-KENT LAW
REvrFw 266.
14 See the exhaustive treatment of the subject by Rutledge, J., in President and
Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810 (1942), particularly pp.
817-22.
15326 Ill. App. 386, 62 N. B. (2d) 11 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGo-KENT L&w
RwEw 346.
16 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 421; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.94.
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while it possessed full existence, 17 the reasoning behind such decision may be sufficient to undermine the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Chicago Title aind Trust Company v. 4136
Wilcox Building Corporation.' It had there been decided, in the
light of the then existing statutory provisions, that an Illinois
corporation, subsequent to decree of dissolution, could not avail
itself of the beneficient provisions for reorganization to be found
in the national Bankruptcy Act. It would now seem, by reason of
the statutory amendment and the holding in the noted case, that
application to the federal courts to secure reorganization should
be possible despite the termination of corporate existence, provided the application is made within two years from the date of

dissolution.
Two cases affecting the specialized business of banking might
also be noted. The Banking Act purports to give the State Auditor
exclusive jurisdiction over the affairs of insolvent state banks, 19
and that provision has heretofore been regarded as sufficient to
prevent a stockholder thereof from maintaining a representative
suit upon claims arising prior to insolvency. 20 The decision in one
of these cases, that of Rinn v. Broadway Trust & Savings Bank of
Chicago,2 1 however, would seem to suggest that such rule is not
applicable where the claims of the creditors of the insolvent bank
have been discharged, even though the Auditor's receivership and
dissolution proceeding has not been terminated, on the questionable ground that there is no longer any public interest in the
proceeding. It would seem to be more nearly the law that the
shareholder, instead of pursuing an independent course, ought
to use mandamus proceedings against the State Auditor to compel
17 Prior to that amendment, the statute merely provided for the survival of actions against the corporation: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, § 157.94.
18 302 U. S. 120, 58 S. Ct. 125, 82 L. Ed. 147 (1937).

19 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 16Y2, § 11.
2o McIlvaine v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 314 Ill. App. 496, 42 N. E.
(2d) 93 (1942) ; Lorimer v. Rosehill Cemetery Co., 325 Ill. App. 258, 59 N. E. (2d)
893 (1945), abst. opin.
21326 Ill. App. 376, 62 N. E. (2d) 8 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 188.
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him to take action. 22 The other case has bearing on the legislative action, taken in 1941, to alleviate the distress arising from
the banking collapse of 1933. That collapse produced many suits
against former stockholders in closed banks, based upon their
constitutional liability, even though they had ceased to be shareholders years prior to the time of closing. By a special statute of
limitations, the legislature required all such suits to be maintained
within one year next after the cause of action accrued. 23 Content
has been given to that statute by the decision in the case of Geister
v. Benke 24 where it was held that the limitation period there fixed
does not begin to run on a tort claim against the bank until the
same has been reduced to judgment, but when so reduced, the time
is running in favor of the shareholder even though an appeal may
have been taken therefrom. A suit filed within one year from the
time of the affirmance of such judgment on appeal2 5 but more than
one year after its rendition was, consequently, held barred by lapse
of time.
Principles of law regarding partnerships, unincorporated
associations and other forms of business organization have gone
unquestioned during the period of this survey.
/
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT

Despite the findings of a jury of reasonable men that the
servant was acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of the injuries to the plaintiff, the Appellate Court, in
Boehmer v. Norton,26 held as a matter of law that the servant had
deviated from his employer's business and was engaged upon a
22 The analogy between banking and insurance company liquidations is close.
Control over the latter is exclusively vested in the Director of Insurance: People
ex rel. Palmer v. Niehaus, 356 Ill. 104, 190 N. E. 349 (1934). The only remedy of
the private person to compel performance of duty in such cases has been limited
therein to mandamus: People ex rel. Gosling v. Potts, 264 Ill. 522, 106 N. E. 524
(1914) ; American Surety Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 222, 51 N. E. (2d) 122 (1943).
23 Laws 1941, Vol 1, p. 272; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 16%, §§ 6a-6h.
24 328 Ill. App. 357, 66 N. E. (2d) 313 (1946).
25 The mere pendency of an appeal has been held to be insufficient to postpone the
commencement of the running of the statute period: Peoria County v. Gordon, 82
11. 435 (1876).
26 328 Ill. App. 17, 65 N. E. (2d) 212 (1946). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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frolic of his own. The plaintiff therein, a boy of sixteen, another
boy friend, and the defendant's servant, a boy eighteen years old,
were sitting in the front seat of the defendant's car, which the
servant was driving to the defendant's garage from the defendant's place of business. Instead of taking the usual and direct
course to the garage the driver proceeded in an opposite direction
several blocks and then turned around to go bak to the garage,
driving at a fast speed. He passed the point where he should
have turned to go to the garage and was continuing to the end of
a dead-end street, a distance of several hundred feet, when the
car skidded because of the speed and an icy condition, injuring
the plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel contended that the driver-servant,
after passing the point where he should have turned to go to the
defendant's garage, re-entered the master's employment the
moment he decided to proceed to the dead-end and to make a
U-turn. In rejecting this contention, the court held that "a reentry is not effected merely by the mental attitude of the servant,
but there must be that attitude coupled with a reasonable connection in time and space with the work in which he should be
engaged.' 27 The force of the plaintiff's argument was impaired
by the testimony of the driver that "Your guess is as good as mine
why I was going down to that dead-end," and that "I passed a lot
of driveways so that I could have turned around."
In another case, that of Dean ,%.Ketter,2 8 it was held that cab
drivers of the North Shore Cab Company, operating in the vicinity
of Highland Park, were independent contractors so that the negligence of the cab driver could not be imputed to the defendant cab
company. The automobile was owned by the cab company but
the testimony showed that while the name "North Shore Cab"
appeared thereon the defendant company rented the car to the
driver on a mileage basis, that the driver was free to accept calls
or not as he pleased, and that the defendant had no control over
the operation of the car nor of the receipts from such operation.
Whether one is a servant or independent contractor depends, of
course, upon the facts of each case. If there was a presumption
27 328 Ill.
App. 17 at 24, 65 N. E. (2d) 212 at 215.
28 328 Ill. App. 206. 65 N. E. (2d) 572 (1946).
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of agency arising from the name on the taxicab, that presumption,
the court said, "entirely vanished by the testimony of the driver."
It also noted that the general rule as to the vanishing of a presumption upon the introduction of testimony to the contrary is
particularly applicable in cases involving automobile accidents, in
which cases the appearance of the name of the owner on the
vehicle cannot be considered "as inducing a third party to act or
rely upon any presumption therefrom to his peril or injury." In
considering the scope of this decision, it should be borne in mind,
for whatever it might be worth, that ,the plaintiff was a third
person who could claim no privity with the cab company such as
might obtain had the injured person been a passenger in the cab.
The apparent authority of a sales clerk to make a representation binding on the principal was under consideration in Lindroth
v. Walgreen Company2 9 wherein an eighteen-month old infant was
severely burned allegedly because the mother of the infant, when
purchasing a vaporizer, relied upon the statements of the sales
girl in a local drug store that although the vaporizer had no
automatic shut-off it would be "safe for at least two hours" to
leave without watching. The defendant's claim that the statement
was purely one of opinion, not a warranty, and was made without
authority was rejected as being within the scope of an apparent
authority unaffected by any secret arrangement between the defendant and its clerk. A directed verdict was, accordingly, set
asideA0
Two cases involving real estate brokers are worthy of mention.
In Kralus v. Campe,31 it was held that a real estate broker cannot
claim commissions when the contract negotiated by him on behalf
of his principal cannot be specifically enforced against the purchaser because defectively prepared. 2 In Reid v. Chicago-Title &
29 329 Il. App. 105, 67 N. E. (2d) 595 (1946).
so The court held that the manufacturer might also be held liable since there was
a prima facie showing that the vaporizer was an article imminently dangerous and
defectively constructed: 329 I1. App. 105 at 120, 67 N. E. (2d) 595 at 603.
31328 Ill. App. 37, 65 N. E. (2d) 127 (1946).
32 The contract failed because of insufficiency of description, there being no city,
town, section, township, range, county or state mentioned in the contract, the
property being described as "a 2-apartment brick building and a 2-car brick garage,
street number 2539 Gunnison Street."
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Trust Company,33 a suit for commissions, the court held that, in
the absence of a contractual or an agency relation between them, a
prospective purchaser is under no duty to submit his offer to
purchase to a broker merely because the real estate which the
purchaser ultimately bought was first submitted to him by such
broker. A real estate broker representing the owner and a prospective buyer deal at arm's length with each other. Just as the
broker is free to negotiate for the purchase by other buyers so is
the prospective purchaser free to deal with and submit his offers
to purchase through other brokers. Accepting the facts as true,
the most that could be said of them, the court stated, was that the
prospective purchaser "failed to observe the proprieties that
should prevail in the real estate field between real estate brokers
and prospective purchasers. "
The court, in People v. Parker,34 considering the duty of fidelity owed by a lawyer to his client and the duty of good faith and
honorable dealing owed by him to the judicial tribunals before
whom he practices his profession, unsparingly condemned, as "far
more reprehensible" than the acts of the client, the conduct of the
attorney for asserting as true, in a brief filed for his client, the
many wild, malignant and scandalous charges made against individuals, prominent public officials, and all of the courts of the state
contained in affidavits and documents filed by the client with the
clerk of the court. Such attorney was false to his obligations, the
court said, when he filed the brief in question and "has proven,
out of his own month, that he is not fit to serve as a 'minister in
35
the temple of justice.' "
While the federal courts have been busy giving interpretation
and content to a variety of federal statutes affecting labor law,3 6
nothing of importance has been decided on that subject in the state
7
courts.8
33 329 Ill. App. 134, 67 N. E. (2d) 411 (1946).
34328 Ill. App. 46, 65 N. E. (2d) 457 (1946).
35 328 Ii1. App. 46 at 60, 65 N. E. (2d) 457 at 463.
36 Such cases are outside of the scope of this survey for only developments in the
local law are here considered.
37 Cases dealing with the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act are treated
under the subject of Taxation. C.f., post.
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WORKMEN 'S COMPENSATION

A few notable decisions in the field of workmen's compensation have appeared. In one of them, that of ChristianCounty v.
Industrial Commission,88 the majority of the Supreme Court held
that the automatic coverage provisions of the act did not apply to
benefit a public health nurse whose work was not extra-hazardous
in fact. Section 3 of the statute does provide that the act shall
apply automatically and without election to various political subdivisions of the state, but the wording the balance of the section
makes its possible to interpret the automatic provision as applying
only to enterprises therein declared to be extra-hazardous.3 9 Such,
in fact, was the interpretation given. The dissenting opinion, on
the other hand, expressed the view that the nurse was a covered
employee since it was well-known that some departments of the
public employer were engaged in hazardous activities and earlier
precedents had established the rule that if some employees were
automatically included then all, even those working a considerable
distance from the hazardous operations, were under the Workmen's Compensation Act.40 The majority not only ignored such
precedents but seemed to regard each separate activity of the
county as a distinct enterprise. When a body politic is the
employer, therefore, it will be necessary, in each case, to ascertain
as a matter of fact whether or not the applicant for compensation
has been engaged in an extra-hazardous activity.
In another case, that of City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 1 the applicant was a city license investigator who, as a
part of his employment, customarily walked about the city streets
canvassing places of business. He stubbed his toe when stepping
upon a sidewalk, aggravated a diabetic condition, and eventually
38 391 Ill. 475, 63 N. E. (2d) 515 (1945), noted in 34 Ill. B. J. 538. Gunn, J.,
wrote a dissenting opinion concurred In by Wilson and Smith, JJ.
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 139.
40 See, for example, Illinois Publishing & Printing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 299
Ill. 189, 132 N. E. 511 (1921).

41 389 Il. 592, 60 N. E. (2d) 212 (1945), noted in 34 Il1. B. J. 180.
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had to have his leg amputated. An award in his favor was affirmed
upon finding that the injury suffered on the street was in the
course of his employment, had a causal relation to it, and consequently the ultimate injury arose out of his employment. An
exception to the doctrine that the risk must be one peculiar to the
work, 42 and not one to which everyone is subject, created in favor
of employees whose duties require them to use the streets, 43 seems
to be expanding.
The third case, that of F. K. Ketler Conpany v. Industrial
Commission,4 4 called for interpretation of Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.4 5 The deceased employee therein was
killed while driving piles for the employing company on a bridge
project for a railroad. The widow sued the railroad, which was
not under the Illinois act, in a common-law action for negligence.
Although the railroad correctly disclaimed liability under the
common law or otherwise, it paid the widow $4000 in settlement
and the action was dismissed. On proceedings under the act
against the employer, an award in the amount of $4895 was granted
to the widow. The employer then asked, pursuant to Section 29,
that it be given credit to the extent of the amount paid by the
railroad. The Supreme Court held, very properly, that credit
should be denied as there had been no negligence whatever on the
part of the railroad and credit is possible only where the circumstances create a "legal liability for damages on the part of some
person other than the employer."

See note in 39 Ill. L. Rev. 187.
Olson Drilling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 386 Ill. 402, 54 N. E. (2d) 452
(1944).
44392 Ill. 564, 65 N. E. (2d) 359 (1946), noted in 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 522.
.45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 166.
42

43

